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Survey research suggests that ‘ever looser union’ is the
direction of travel for the UK
The debate in the Scottish independence referendum suggests even a no vote will be followed by greater
autonomy for Scotland. In Wales, too, the National Assembly has extended its powers and may continue to do
so, while England is also seeing clamour for devolution. In this post Richard Wyn Jones questions whether
the UK’s institutions can respond to the desire for weaker ties between the home nations.
While the ref erendum will pose the choice f acing the Scottish electorate as one between independence and
the status quo, the surrounding polit ical campaigning poses the choice in dif f erent terms: between
independence and f urther self -government. This was presaged in a caref ully worded statement in
Edinburgh in February 2012 by Prime Minister David Cameron, who strongly implied that a ‘No’ vote would
lead to f urther devolution. The Unionist polit ical parties have all established various internal processes
aimed at f ormulating their own enhanced schemes. Indeed, it appears that there are moves af oot behind
the scenes to try to agree a joint-unionist alternative of f er to be announced bef ore the ref erendum. To the
extent that a posit ive case is being put f orward f or the Union, it is f or a Union in which the already powerf ul
devolved Scottish parliament enjoys more autonomy and control over Scottish lif e.
The reasons f or this become apparent on perusal of  the polling evidence. Opponents of  independence do
not t ire of  pointing out (quite correctly) that there is no evidence that there has ever been more than
minority support f or such an outcome among the Scottish electorate. But even if  they are more reticent of
admitt ing it in public, they are also well aware that the constitutional status quo also enjoys only limited
support. Rather, survey af ter survey demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of  Scots wish to see
their devolved parliament enjoy substantially more powers. Indeed, it appears that only in the case of
f oreign and def ence policy competences do we f ind a majority of  Scots believing that competence should
remain at the Westminster level (Table 1). If  these sentiments are not somehow assuaged then unionists
are in danger of  winning the battle but losing the war.
Table 1: Scotland: Which level of Government should have most influence over the following policy
areas, 2012 
Herein lies the rub. Viewed in retrospect, the Unionists’ most recent attempt to redraw the Scottish
settlement – via the Calman Commission and the subsequent 2012 Scotland Act – was poorly judged. It
produced a f inancial package that appears to have been designed to f orce the Scottish authorit ies into
taking polit ically contentious decisions, while at the same time granting them litt le or nothing by the way of
additional, genuinely usable policy autonomy. So while the Scottish parliament will now have no option other
than to take decisions on tax rates in Scotland – in itself , an entirely sensible development – it has not
been entrusted with the ability to vary any changes between tax bands. This is hardly the kind of
arrangement that one would associate with a genuine attempt at empowerment. This impression is
conf irmed when it is also recalled that, beyond the f inancial aspects of  the settlement, the headline ‘extra
powers’ granted to Edinburgh were over air guns and speed limits: important in their way, no doubt, but
small beer in constitutional terms.
Will the Unionists do better this t ime? They surely have the incentive to do so. This is hardly the time f or
niggardly att itudes. But they also f ace genuine dilemmas, especially if  as seems to be the case, they are
determined to maintain cross-party unity while doing so. Not least because devolving signif icant elements
of  Welf are appears anathema to Labour, even while it rails against the various ref orms and cuts being
introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK coalit ion government. Moreover, even if  they can
agree and enact a more generous dispensation, it appears almost certain that it will f ail to match the
aspirations of  the Scottish electorate. Assuming Scotland stays in the Union, its relationship with the
central state will be looser than has been the case until now, and that there will remain substantial pressure
f or yet f urther devolution of  power.
Wales
Given the relative lack of  interest even at the prospect of  Scottish independence, it is no surprise that
developments in Wales enjoy even less prominence in the London media. Yet between 1999 and 2011, at
least, it was Wales that provided much the most dramatic changes in both public att itudes and institutional
architecture across the post-devolution UK.
From very unpromising beginnings, characterised by weak public support and a constitutional design that
proved to be utterly inadequate, the National Assembly f or Wales has rapidly gained both popular legit imacy
and additional powers. This culminated in a very one-sided ref erendum campaign in March 2011 f ought on
the issue of  additional powers. A ref erendum that saw an easy victory f or the pro-devolution camp, with
their opponents reduced to a small, rather chaotic rump.
Yet passing that milestone appears to have done nothing to quieten the clamour f or f urther devolution.
Rather, the Silk Commission, established by the UK government in October 2011, has already recommended
the devolution of  tax and borrowing powers to Wales, in terms that are broadly analogous to those
recommended to Scotland by the Calman Commission. Following an apparently f ractious period of  inter-
coalit ion wrangling, the UK has recently announced that it will be implementing most of  the Silk
recommendation. While Silk’s insistence that a ref erendum be held bef ore income tax can be devolved –
coupled to the very obvious reluctance of  the Wales Labour Party to hold such a poll – means that the key
element of  the package is likely to remain unimplemented f or the f oreseeable f uture, the very f act that a
Conservative- led administration is pushing devolution f orward is in itself  a remarkable development.
Meanwhile the Commission itself  has turned its attention to the second part of  its mandate, and is
considering the Welsh devolution dispensation more broadly. The Welsh Government has taken the
opportunity to call f or f urther, substantial changes. These involve, in part, correcting the continuing
inadequacies of  the Welsh dispensation, by moving f rom a ‘conf erred powers’ (as envisaged f or Scotland
in the 1978 Scotland Act) to a ‘reserved powers’ (as eventually implemented by the 1998 Scotland Act)
model of  devolution. But in addition, Cardif f  has called f or the devolution of  policing and – as a longer-term
objective – criminal justice as a whole. As can be seen f rom the opinion poll evidence in Table 2, both these
developments apparently enjoy strong support among the Welsh electorate at large. Other ideas put
f orward to the Commission include the establishment of  a separate legal jurisdiction f or Wales, and (by the
Conservative opposition in the National Assembly, no less) the devolution of  broadcasting. While there is
no direct evidence of  public att itudes on these latter possibilit ies, it is nonetheless clear that, among both
the Welsh polit ical class and the population at large, the appetite f or the f urther devolution of  power is f ar
f rom sated. Even if  the country’s parlous economic condition means that there is f ar less appetite in Wales
than in Scotland f or devolving Welf are f unctions, it is nonetheless clear that the country’s f uture
relationship with the UK state will be characterised by greater autonomy and self -government. In other
words, a looser Union.
Table 2: Wales: Which level of Government should have most influence over the following policy
areas, 2013 
England
Until recently the perception had been that the English viewed the devolution process across the rest of
the UK with what might be termed benign indif f erence. Broadly speaking they were relaxed about
developments elsewhere in the state, so long as they continued to be governed by the f amiliar institutions
of  Westminster and Whitehall. This prevailing wisdom has been challenged by research carried out by a
team f rom Cardif f  and Edinburgh Universit ies and the Institute f or Public Policy Research (IPPR), under the
banner of  the ‘Future of  England Survey’ (see an overview of  the survey results).
Whatever the situation that pertained in the early years of  devolution, it appears support in England f or the
territorial status quo has now f allen dramatically to no more than 1 in 4 of  the population. In the context of
a widespread perception that it is unf airly treated f ollowing devolution (what we have termed ‘devoanxiety’),
it appears that a majority wish to see England explicit ly and posit ively recognised by the governmental
system, rather than the present situation of  being a kind of  residual category lef t over as a result of
devolution elsewhere. There is, however, no consensus as to what f orm such recognition should take.
Not only that, but it appears that English national identity is being polit icised. The more exclusively English a
person’s sense of  national identity, or the more strongly the English element of  a joint or ‘nested’ Anglo-
Brit ish identity is stressed, the more likely a person is to f eel that England is unf airly treated by the current
arrangements, and the more strongly they want to see a posit ive recognition of  England qua England by
the polit ical system.
English dissatisf action with the internal territorial constitution of  the UK is also, it transpires, closely
related to dissatisf action with the state’s external relationship with the European Union. Thus, even if
Eurosceptic rhetoric posits ‘Europe’ as a threat to Brit ish values and tradit ions, it is in f act those who f eel
most exclusively English that are more hostile to the UK’s membership of  the EU. Indeed, counter- intuit ive
though it may be to many, the most exclusively Brit ish a person’s sense of  national identity the more pro-
European they tend to be.
The overall picture emerging strongly f rom the latest research is theref ore of  signif icant English discontent
with both of  the polit ical unions of  which their country is a part: with the United Kingdom as well as with the
European Union. All of  which suggest not only that pressure will continue to mount f or an attempt, at least,
to develop a looser relationship between the UK and the EU (as already promised by David Cameron), but
also that pressure to redraw relationships within the UK in ways that grant the various national units more
autonomy will emanate not only f rom Scotland and Wales, but increasingly f rom England too.
All of  which poses a prof ound challenge of  polit ical and constitutional imagination. Can the institutions of
the UK state actually adapt in ways that would give expression to the apparent public desire f or ‘Ever
looser Union’? Thus f ar the devolution process, while leading to radical if  not revolutionary changes at the
periphery, has lef t those central institutions almost entirely unchanged. So, f or example, even the UK
government’s territorial of f ices f or Scotland and Wales have survived, even if  it  is hard to f athom how this
could possibly be justif ied now those nations have their own law-making parliaments and powerf ul
governments. But a f urther, more generous package of  devolution to Scotland, in particular, would surely
require major ref orms at the centre –up to and including a written constitution – in order to ensure the
proper f unctioning of  what would then be a highly decentralised state.
In their way, however, England and English sentiments provide an even more prof ound challenge to the
state. If  the current f usion of  UK and English f unctions in UK-level institutions is somehow brought to an
end – which is, af ter all, what an increasing proportion of  the English population seem to want – then
institutionally speaking, everything would change. Indeed, while our attention will naturally f ocus on
Scotland over the coming year, English discontent with both of  the Unions of  which England f orms a part
may well ult imately prove a greater threat to the state than nationalist sentiment north of  the border.
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